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COMMENTARY




HIS Commentary examines the phenomena of recent state legislation
limiting or eradicating the duty of care. The Commentary also ad-
dresses statutory developments affecting indemnification of corporate
fiduciaries. Rather than analyzing the particular aspects of the various state
statutes, the Commentary focuses on the broad public policy issues.
I. DIRECTOR-PROTECTION STATUTES-DELAWARE AND BEYOND
When the Delaware Supreme Court held in Smith v. Van Gorkom I that
the defendant directors' conduct failed to come within the business judgment
rule,2 thereby resulting in a violation of the duty of care,3 few observers
* Visiting Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, Fall 1988, Southern Methodist
University School of Law; Professor of Law, University of Maryland, School of Law. Mem-
ber, California, Maryland, and District of Columbia bars. Copyright 1988 by Marc I. Stein-
berg. All rights reserved.
The author serves as a legal consultant and has been retained as an expert witness on mat-
ters relating to breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate directors and other fiduciaries. The
views herein are solely those of the author.
The author thanks Jeffrey P. Weiss (J.D., University of Maryland, 1988) for his helpful
research.
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 874. For a discussion of the business judgment rule, see The Business Judgment
Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
3. 488 A.2d at 881. A number of commentators were critical of the decision. See, e.g.,
Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1455
(1985) ("one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law"); Herzel & Katz, Smith v.
Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187, 1188 (1986)
("the court's decision seems misguided"); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in
the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985) ("the corporate bar generally
views the decision as atrocious"); Herzel, Davis & Coiling, "Smith" Brings Whip Down on
Directors'Backs, Legal Times, May 13, 1985, at 14, col. 1 ("dumbfounding"). Some commen-
tators were supportive of the decision, or at least felt that it did not spell doom for directors.
See, e.g., Chittur, The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10
DEL. J. CORP. L. 505, 542 (1985) ("in tune with contemporary thinking"); Prickett, An Expla-
nation of Trans Union to "Henny-Penny" and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 462
(1985) ("the only justifiable result"); Schwartz & Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New"Law nor
"Bad" Law, 10 DEL J. CORP. L. 429, 430 (1985) ("the case merely represents a reiteration of
existing Delaware law"); see also Brennan, New Cases on the Business Judgment Rule: Defend-
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could presage that a "revolution" would occur in the world of corporate
fiduciary obligations under state law. Shocked at the Delaware court's
"chutzpah" in imposing liability where no self-dealing or other breach of the
duty of loyalty existed, 4 corporate fiduciaries and their counsel clamored for
action.5 Delaware, wishing to retain its preeminent position as the state of
incorporation for nearly half of the New York Stock Exchange listed compa-
nies, 6 was accommodating. Within a few months, Delaware enacted legisla-
tion overturning Van Gorkom.7 Today, provided that an appropriate
amendment is inserted into the articles of incorporation, directors are not
monetarily liable unless they commit a breach of the duty of loyalty, declare
an unlawful distribution, receive an improper personal benefit, or act in bad
faith.8 Monetary liability in Delaware for "simple" gross negligence is a
relic of the past. 9
Delaware's evisceration of the duty of care prompted companies incorpo-
rated elsewhere to warn state houses that they would opt for Delaware char-
tering unless those states adopted similar statutes. I0 The state legislators
enthusiastically responded, with at least thirty-six such statutes currently in
effect. I I
Most of these statutes resemble Delaware's; they are enabling statutes
designed to eliminate monetary liability of directors for breach of the duty of
care and to ease a director's task in obtaining indemnification. 12 Several
ing Defensive Tactics Becomes More Difficult, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 245, 249 (1986) (analyzing
Van Gorkom as "a short step" from prior holdings).
4. 488 A.2d at 873.
5. See Sparks, Delaware's D&O Liability Law: Other States Should Follow Suit, Legal
Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at 10, col. 1.
6. See Ingersoll, SEC Backs Tatke & Lyle Court Challenge to Delaware's New Anti-Take-
over Law, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1988, at 19, col. 2 ("56% of the Fortune 500 companies and
almost half of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in
[Delaware]").
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 145 (1983 & Supp. 1986). For detailed analyses,
see Balotti & Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability for Delaware Corpora-
tions, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5 (1987); Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors
with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW.
399 (1987).
8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). The meaning of the term "lack
of good faith" is discussed in Balotti & Gentile, supra note 7, at 18.
9. Because § 102(b)(7) is solely an enabling provision, directors will enjoy the benefits of
the statute only if an applicable provision is contained in the corporation's articles of incorpo-
ration, normally by approval of the majority of shares outstanding.
10. See Hanks, State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability Crisis, 20 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 23, 25 (1987).
11. See Hanks, Maryland Adopts Director and Officer Liability Statute, 2 INSIGHTS, No. 3,
Mar. 1988, at 29; Hanks, Update on State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability Crisis,
21 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 23, 24-29 (1988) (and citations contained therein); Ra-
din, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J.
707, 747-52 (1988) (and citations contained therein).
12. See Radin, supra note 11, at 747-48 ("As of the end of 1987, legislation modeled upon
the Delaware statute has been enacted in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.") (citations omitted).
The Texas statute allows shareholders to amend the articles of incorporation to release direc-
tors from monetary liability to the corporation or its shareholders for acts or omissions in the
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states, however, were not content merely to enact Delaware-type statutes.
Seeking to show the corporate community that their forums were conducive
to businesses' concerns, 13 these states enacted legislation that clearly "out-
Delawared" the kingpin of corporate well-being. For example, pursuant to
these statutes, officers as well as directors come under the protective um-
brella, 14 certain breaches of the duty of loyalty are not actionable, 15 and
liability for breach of the duty of care is eliminated for injunctive as well as
for monetary relief. 16 A few of these statutes apply their provisions irrespec-
tive of whether a corporation has amended its articles of incorporation. 17
Recent legislation enacted by Maryland18 and Virginia 19 illustrate these
states seizing the opportunity to out-do their northern neighbor. In addition
to containing the usual exculpatory provisions,20 Virginia's statute, subject
to certain exceptions, includes a damages ceiling limited to the greater of
$100,000 or one-year's cash compensation received by the defendant. If ap-
proved by shareholders, a lower monetary ceiling may be applied, or even
eliminated. 21 Maryland's statute is even more favorable to corporate fiducia-
ries; absent an improper benefit, directors and officers are monetarily liable
only for "active and deliberate dishonesty."22 In addition to absolving head-
in-the-sand conduct, the Maryland statute, similar to certain other stat-
utes,23 may make derivative litigation profitable only for the lawyers. His-
torically, in derivative litigation, although reasonable expenses could be
director's capacity as a director, except in cases of: breach of the duty of loyalty, acts not in
good faith or involving intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, receipt of an
improper personal benefit, commission of statutory violations, and acts relating to illegal stock
repurchases or dividend payments. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B)
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
13. See Goolsby & Whitson, Virginia's New Corporate Code, 19 REV. SEC. & COMMODI-
TIES REG. 147 (1986).
14. Eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4) (West Supp. 19887); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. §§ 2-405.2, 2-418 (Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(1) (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:2-73 (West Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A)(1) (Supp. 1988).
15. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037 (1987). Few states have this type of provision.
16. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1987) (also raises the
standard of proof to that of clear and convincing evidence).
17. See FL. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645 (West Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)
(Bums Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1987); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 13.1-690 (A), (C) (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.307(1) (West Supp. 1987).
18. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 2-405.2, 2-418 (Supp. 1988).
19. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-690 (A), (C), 13.1-692.1(A)-(C) (1985 & Supp. 1988). For
analyses of Virginia law, see Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 13; Honabach, All That Glitters:
A Critique of the Revised Virginia Stock Corporation Act, 12 J. CORP. L. 433 (1987); King,
Director Protection Under Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 129 (1987).
20. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (A), (C) (1985).
21. Id. § 13.1-692.1(A), (B) (Supp. 1988); see Radin, supra note 11, at 752. The Virginia
statute contains certain exceptions. Liability may not be limited for willful misconduct or
knowing violations of criminal or securities laws. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-692.1(B) (Supp.
1988). Also, amendments may not function retroactively to relieve liability for acts committed
prior to the adoption of the amendment. Id. § 13.1-692.1(C).
22. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988).
23. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.014(2) (West Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-
8(a) (Bums Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A)(2) (West Supp. 1988); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1562 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.044(2)(a) (West Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-
105.1(a) (1987).
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reimbursed, amounts paid by defendant fiduciaries in settlement could not
be indemnified. Such a position is necessary to avoid the circularity of recov-
ery that would otherwise result.24 Under the Maryland statute, however,
unless it is proven that the defendant fiduciary acted in bad faith, engaged in
active and deliberate dishonesty, or received an improper personal benefit,
then the fiduciary may be indemnified if certain conditions are met.25
II. POLICY MERITS (OR DEMERITS) OF
DIRECTOR-PROTECTION STATUTES
Do these statutes make bad policy? Given the asserted insurance crisis
and the reaction to the Van Gorkom decision, one can argue that the Dela-
ware statute was a balanced response to the problem. After Van Gorkom,
outside directors, it was alleged, were reluctant to serve on corporate
boards.26 Given Delaware's financial dependence on franchise revenues and
that state's concern with maintaining its preeminent status, 27 action was
deemed necessary. Delaware reacted, particularly when viewed by hind-
sight, with moderation. The duty of care remains good law in Delaware in
suits for injunctive relief. For actions not implicating the duty of loyalty
that seek monetary damages, the culpability standard is lack of good faith,
provided that a charter provision is adopted. Hence, actions for breach of
fiduciary duty, even in the absence of self-dealing, still may be viable in
Delaware.
On the other hand, it may be asserted that Van Gorkom was correctly
decided. Directors considering a mega-million dollar merger transaction,
who meet only for two hours and principally rely on a twenty-minute oral
presentation by the chief executive officer, are not reasonably informed and
act with gross negligence, if not with recklessness. 2s Shareholders ought to
be entitled to demand greater scrutiny on the part of their elected fiduciaries.
Certainly, accountants, attorneys, physicians, and other professionals are lia-
ble for mere negligence. 29 Because corporations are engaged in risk-taking
24. See REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 8.51(e) (1984). Comment 5 to § 8.51,
which concerns subsection (e), provides:
This subsection limits indemnification in suits brought by or in the right of the
corporation to expenses incurred in connection with the proceeding. Its purpose
is to avoid circularity that would be involved if a corporation seeks to indemnify
a director for payments made in settlement by the director to the corporation.
Id.; see also Hansell, Austin & Wilcox, Director Liability Under Iowa Law-Duties and Protec-
tions, 13 J. CORP. L. 369, 402 (1988) (explaining Iowa provisions preventing circularity).
25. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (Supp. 1988).
26. See Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56, 56-58; Block,
Barton & Garfield, Advising Directors on the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 130, 131-
32 (1986); Director Roundtable: The D&O Crisis and Board Liability, DIRECTORS & BOARDS,
Summer 1986, at 8, 9-10.
27. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 697-98 (1974); Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lob-5 and the New
Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 267-72 (1980); Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATIONS 225, 240 (1985) (revenues of
corporate chartering constitute almost 17% of Delaware's revenues).
28. See Chittur, Prickett, and Schwartz & Wiles, supra note 3.
29. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1879) (attorney negligence); Ban-
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ventures, corporate fiduciaries arguably should be provided with greater pro-
tection. 30 The business judgment rule meets this objective, insulating fiduci-
aries from liability provided their decisions are reasonably informed, made in
good faith without a disabling conflict of interest, and have a rational basis.31
Although the business judgment rule does not prevent "Monday morning
quarterbacking" based on the benefit of hindsight, this problem is by no
means unique to corporate fiduciaries. It is a characteristic common to mak-
ers of difficult decisions, whether they be doctors, lawyers, or football
coaches.
To justify greater protection provided to corporate fiduciaries beyond that
of the business judgement rule, cogent reasons should prevail. The pur-
ported insurance crisis is the key rationale provided. 32 But lawyers and doc-
tors as well as other professionals are also confronted with this crisis; 33
however, they must act with due care.34 It may be asserted that the differ-
ence is that, absent the availability of adequate insurance and indemnifica-
tion, outside directors would refuse to serve on corporate boards.35 The
adverse consequence would be the loss of competent overseers who effec-
tively monitor corporate managers, thereby causing a fundamental break-
down in the corporate accountability structure.36 Presuming that this
assertion is meritorious, corrective legislative action is needed only for
outside directors, in other words, for those persons who do not otherwise
have an employment relationship with the company. 37 Yet, the Delaware
statute provides insulation for inside directors as well, giving as its justifica-
croft v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 203 F. Supp. 49, 53 (W.D. La.) (accountant negligence),
aff'd, 309 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1962); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441,
444 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.) (accountants have duty to use the "care and caution proper to their
calling"); 3 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 473 (4th ed. 1932) (discussing duty of the learned profes-
sions); 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.6 (2d ed. 1986).
30. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 926-27 (1979).
31. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 4.01(d) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984); M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIA-
BILITIES AND REMEDIES § 14.02 (1988); Wander & LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters." Corporate
Control Transactions and Today's Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAW. 29, 29-30 (1986).
32. See Herzel, Shepro & Katz, Next-to-Last Word on Endangered Directors, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 38, 38; Mallen & Evans, Surviving the Directors'and Officers'Liability
Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 459-64 (1987); authorities
cited supra notes 7, 26. But see Waldman & Garcia, Four Big Insurers Charged with Scheme to
Limit Commercial Liability Coverage, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1988, at 2, col. 2 ("Seven state
attorneys general... charged four of the nation's largest insurers with conspiring to manipu-
late the availability and cost of commercial liability coverage.").
33. See sources cited supra note 32.
34. See authorities cited supra note 29.
35. See authorities cited supra note 26.
36. See Brudney, The Role of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 223, 234-36 (1983); The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of
the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2107-08
(1978); Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1625-27 (1978).
37. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.17 comment (g), at 264 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Draft No. 8].
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tion policy reasons that in large measure apply only to outside directors. 38
Although the Delaware statute may be imperfect, it is a source of reason
compared to the statutes of several other states. Although a broad survey of
the various statutes is beyond this Commentary's focus, a few examples suf-
fice to confirm this point. One such example is that a number of states ex-
tend the parameters of their statutes to encompass corporate officers. 39
These provisions exacerbate the deficiencies of the Delaware legislation. In-
deed, no convincing evidence exists suggesting that the insurance crisis has
chilled the willingness of senior executives to embrace the benefits of their
corporate status.40 An even more troubling provision contained in some
statutes eliminates corporate fiduciary liability, absent self-dealing or certain
other exceptions, unless the fiduciary acts with deliberate dishonesty. 41 A
fairly recent case, Francis v. United Jersey Bank,42 illustrates the delinquent
misconduct that these statutes now permit to go monetarily unpunished. In
that case, the defendant director, Pritchard, was inactive in the business and
remained ignorant of the corporation's affairs. During that time, her sons
mulcted the corporation by withdrawing sums that greatly exceeded profits.
In holding Pritchard liable for breach of the duty of care, the New Jersey
Supreme Court opined: "Her sons knew that she, the only other director,
was not reviewing their conduct; they spawned their fraud in the backwater
of her neglect.' 43 Irrespective of such neglect, this misconduct is unlikely to
be actionable in states adopting the deliberate dishonesty standard." This
38. See Delaware Senate Bill No. 533, L. 1986, amending, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102,
145 (Supp. 1986):
Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments to Section 145 represent a legislative
response to recent changes in the market for directors' liability insurance. Such
insurance has become a relatively standard condition of employment for direc-
tors. Recent changes in that market, including the unavailability of the tradi-
tional policies (and, in many cases, the unavailability of any type of policy from
the traditional insurance carriers) have threatened the quality and stability of
the governance of Delaware corporations because directors have become unwill-
ing, in many instances, to serve without the protection which such insurance
provides and, in other instances, may be deterred by the unavailability of insur-
ance from making entrepreneurial decisions. The amendments are intended to
allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection, in various forms,
to their directors and to limit director liability under certain circumstances.
39. See statutes cited supra note 14.
40. See Draft No. 8, supra note 37, at 264.
41. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645(1) (West 1988); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.
§ 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.307(1) (West Supp. 1987).
42. 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
43. Id. at 44, 432 A.2d at 829; see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4.1, at 125 n.8 (1986):
From a planning perspective, the opinion in Francis offers useful guidelines as to
what every director should do:
(1) get a rudimentary understanding of the business; (2) keep informed about
the corporation's activities; (3) engage in "a general monitoring of corporate
affairs and activities"; (4) attend board meetings regularly; (5) review financial
statements regularly; and (6) make inquiries into doubtful matters, raise objec-
tions to apparently illegal actions, and consult counsel and/or resign if correc-
tions are not made.
44. One can argue that fiduciaries who intentionally ignore their obligations can be held
liable under the deliberate dishonesty standard. The success of such an assertion seems, at
best, uncertain.
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development encourages an ostrich approach to the undertaking of a fiduci-
ary's obligations. If it were not for the liability provisions of the federal se-
curities laws, 45 these state statutes would have an even greater detrimental
effect in causing the emasculation of a responsible corporate accountability
framework.
The indemnification provisions adopted by a number of states serve as a
final example. Under these "post- Van Gorkom" director-protection statutes,
indemnification of fiduciaries is authorized not only for reasonable expenses
incurred, but also for amounts paid in settlement of derivative actions so
long as certain specified conditions are met.46 These statutes expand the
coverage of indemnification, which traditionally has not applied to sums
paid to settle a derivative suit.47 Under the director-protection statutes, the
circularity of derivative actions is evident. The corporation receives the
amount in settlement from the defendant fiduciaries who are thereupon enti-
tled to indemnification from the corporation to whatever extent insurance
does not cover the loss. In this regard, it is possible that the exclusions in
director and officer insurance policies for self-dealing and deliberate miscon-
duct may induce an insurer not to pay a claim in which a matter has been
settled and to which the fiduciary is entitled to indemnification. 48 Moreover,
because these suits are rarely litigated to an adjudication,49 the attorneys on
all sides are the only clear winners in a settlement; they receive their reason-
able fees. Hence, under these statutes, it is evident that the real party in
interest is no longer the corporation; rather, the attorneys are the real parties
to benefit.50
One may argue that in view of inadequate insurance coverage these state
indemnification statutes are necessary to induce outside directors to serve on
corporate boards. Even if this were true, as it may well be,51 such reasoning
does not justify the inclusion of inside directors and officers within the pro-
tective cloak of these statutes.5 2 Rather, when coupled with the procedural
obstacles that a derivative plaintiff must hurdle, particularly the demand on
director requirement,5 3 these statutes convey a hostility by many legislatures
45. See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). See generally Stein-
berg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982).
46. See statutes cited supra note 23.
47. See authorities cited supra note 24.
48. See Draft No. 8, supra note 37, § 7.30 comment (i), at 317-18.
49. See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and
Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-1978, 60 B.U.L. REV. 306, 312-13 (1980).
50. See Draft No. 8, supra note 37, ch. 1 introductory note, at 7-15; id. § 7.13 comment
(e), at 206 (describing plaintiff's counsel as "often the real party in interest").
51. See authorities cited supra notes 19, 32; see also Draft No. 8, supra note 37, § 7.17
reporter's note at 272 ("In recent years, the fear of liability appears to have resulted in several
instances where outside directors have resigned from the board when liability insurance could
not be renewed.").
52. See Draft No. 8, supra note 37, § 7.17 comment (g), at 264.
53. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984). See generally Buxbaum, Con-
flicts-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 1122 (1980) (explaining reasons for demand requirement).
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and courts to this type of litigation. 54 Perhaps the more straightforward
manner of accommodating this perspective is to forbid the initiation of de-
rivative actions for breach of fiduciary duty unless the alleged monetary loss
amounts to a specified dollar total or percentage of the corporation's net
assets, revenues, or profits. Although this route certainly would decrease the
number of derivative suits filed, the federal securities law disclosure man-
dates would still provide a basis for bringing a number of such claims. 55
In this respect, however, many of the state indemnification statutes apply
irrespective of whether a derivative claim is premised on a violation of fed-
eral or state law. 56 A forceful argument can be made that these statutes, and
provisions contained in corporate charters through the authority granted by
such statutes, effectuate a waiver of a complainant's rights and remedies
under the federal securities laws, and are therefore void with respect to such
federal claims.5 7 As section 14 of the Securities Act of 193358 and section
29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193459 provide, statutory and regula-
tory provisions under these Acts cannot be waived, voluntarily or other-
wise. 6° The indemnification of corporate fiduciaries for amounts paid in
settling derivative suits based on alleged federal securities law violations may
be construed as invalidating a claimant's rights and remedies. Although the
litigant's right to bring suit and procure a remedy remains technically intact,
indemnification in this context has the substantive effect of rendering these
federal rights a nullity. 61
Even if the foregoing argument is not ultimately adopted by the courts,
the failure to disclose the ramifications of indemnification to shareholders in
a notice of settlement should be deemed a material disclosure deficiency
under the federal securities laws. A reasonable shareholder certainly would
want to know that, if settled, the derivative suit would not benefit the corpo-
ration due to the granting of indemnification to the defendant fiduciaries.
62
54. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1982) (reversing district court's dismis-
sal of action and remanding matter to a different judge).
55. This statement assumes that the plaintiff can meet the standing, causation, reliance,
culpability, and other requirements necessary in order to have a successful cause of action. See
A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 4-7
(1986); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 144-64 (2d ed. 1988); M.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 411-581 (1986).
56. E.g., MD. CORPS. & ASs'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-418 (Supp. 1988).
57. See Securities Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982); Securities Exchange Act § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). For a discussion of the anti-waiver aspects of federal securities laws,
see Gruenbaum, Avoiding the Protections of the Federal Securities Laws: The Anti- Waiver Pro-
visions, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49 (1980).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
59. Id. § 78cc(a).
60. See generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2339,
96 L.Ed.2d 185, 196 (1987) ("if a stipulation waives compliance with a statutory duty, it is
void.., whether voluntary or not").
61. Note, moreover, that the Securities and Exchange Commission takes the position that
indemnification of directors and officers in regard to liabilities arising under the federal securi-
ties laws is against public policy and, therefore, unenforceable. See Regulation S-K item 510,
17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (1988); see also Globus v. Law Res. Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d
Cir. 1969), (concurs with SEC position) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
62. Cf Draft No. 8, supra note 37, § 7.13(b), at 198 (in evaluating a proposed settlement,
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Such nondisclosure should provide grounds to the bringing of an SEC en-
forcement action,63 as well as private actions, provided that standing and
other requirements are met.64
As a final point, it may be asserted that the vast majority of these statutes
are enabling in nature65 and, therefore, are fully in accord with principles of
corporate accountability. The shareholders' contractual relationship with
the corporation normally is altered in this context only after a majority of
shares outstanding, being adequately informed of the advantages and detri-
ments of such modification, vote to amend the articles of incorporation. 66
Although this argument has certain appeal, its validity rings hollow in light
of the realities of the corporate governance process. Meaningful shareholder
consent in this context is an illusion given management's control of the
proxy machinery process, 67 the strong inclination of institutional investors
to vote with management, 68 and the typical individual stockholder's igno-
rance of corporate charter provisions. 69 Indeed, because these charter
amendments have the effect of frustrating a shareholder's legitimate expecta-
tions, they may be characterized as contracts of adhesion and, therefore,
void. 70 The leverage exerted by management, in any event, should call for
the continued validity of these charter provisions to be subject to periodic
ratification by the shareholders. For example, shareholder approval should
be required every third year after such an amendment's initial passage. 71
III. THE ROAD TO WHERE?
Although a number of statutes have been enacted with more lax provi-
sions than those contained in the Delaware legislation,72 their impact may be
relatively insignificiant unless Delaware amends its statute in response to
these developments. Because the Delaware statute applies only to directors,
permits the imposition of monetary liability for director self-dealing as well
as for actions not taken in good faith, and prohibits circularity of recovery in
settlements of derivative actions, 73 insiders of companies chartered in Dela-
ware remain subject to significant fiduciary obligations. Post-Van Gorkom
the court should, inter alia, consider "any diminution of the recovery that will result from
attorneys' fees or indemnification payments to be made by the corporation"). For the standard
of materiality under the federal securities laws, see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
63. See M. STEINBERG & R. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE
ENFORCEMENT §§ 2.16, 2.22 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
64. See supra note 55.
65. See supra notes 9, 12 and accompanying text.
66. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1984).
67. See Draft No. 8, supra note 37, § 7.17 comment (e), at 255.
68. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 119 (2d ed. 1986).
69. See Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMPLE
L. REV. 13, 30 (1988).
70. See Draft No. 8, supra note 37, § 7.17 comment (e), at 255-56.
71. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.17(c)(1), at 41-43 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987).
72. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 145 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
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director-protection statutes enacted in the majority of states are modeled
upon the Delaware legislation.74 If Delaware declines to react to the more
extreme statutes, 75 other states may follow Delaware's lead.
An eradication of fiduciary duties and perhaps derivative suits would
likely occur, however, if Delaware elects to amend its statute in order to
incorporate the more lax provisions enacted by some states. Such a course
of conduct would have disastrous consequences for shareholders, largely
leaving them without effective redress under state law except in the most
egregious cases of dishonesty and self-dealing. Such legislative action also
may not ultimately be in the best interests of the respective states. Although
cries for federal fiduciary duty of care and loyalty statutes76 generally have
fallen on deaf ears,77 the onset of major scandals in which shareholders are
left penniless while corporate fiduciaries retain the riches could prompt Con-
gress to act. Although Congress often has been loathe to legislate internal
corporate affairs, it has shown a willingness to do so in reaction to national
catastrophes. 78 One fairly recent example is the 1977 enactment of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act 79 in response to domestic slush fund and foreign
bribery practices carried on by several hundred American corporations.80
By mandating, inter alia, that publicly held corporations maintain reason-
able accurate books and records and internal accounting controls, 8 1 the Act
directly impacts upon internal accountability mechanisms.
82
Thus, solely state governance of corporate internal affairs is not sacro-
sanct. The federal government has acted in the past and, if deemed neces-
sary, may do so again. State statutes that decline to recognize legitimate
shareholder expectations in order to accommodate locally situated manage-
ments of companies are short-sighted. Delaware and other major players in
the state-chartering field should not be tempted. In this country's regulation
of publicly held entities, we have achieved a delicate balancing of federal and
state interests while, at the same time, maintaining the investor confidence so
vital to capital formation and growth. Any significant alteration possibly
affecting this balance should be implemented only after careful evaluation
that calls for the undertaking of such action. The statute that Delaware has
enacted, and that a majority of states have basically adopted, stretches this
74. See supra note 12.
75. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 27, at 701-03.
77. A description of the unsuccessful efforts exerted for federal legislation in this area is
contained in Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 27, at 269-72.
78. Of course, Congress's passage in the midst of the Great Depression of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 serve as the key examples.
79. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
80. See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1976).
81. See Securities Exchange Act § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1982).
82. See M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS-A CORPORATE AND SECURI-
TIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 59 (1983) ("the FCPA remains an important illustration of how
Commission efforts geared toward effective corporate disclosure can have a direct impact on
corporate internal affairs").
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balance as far as can be legitimately justified. The evisceration of the duty of
care is a drastic step in the corporate governance framework. Any further
erosion makes a mockery of state law principles of fiduciary duty. Such ex-
pansionist state legislation also may portend the development that states and
corporate fiduciaries fear-the adoption of federal legislation.

